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INTRODUCTION

This Survey article examines the area of criminal procedure by
discussing the most significant rulings by the Illinois Supreme
Court. Some of the major decisions handed down by the court
were in the areas of search and seizure, the right to counsel, and its
waiver and severance. Additionally, this article discusses legislation enacted that relates to the substitution of judges and jury service exemption.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A.

Franks' Attack on a Search Warrant

In People v. Lucente,I police searched Lucente's apartment pursuant to a search warrant.' The police officers charged the defend. 116 Il1. 2d 133, 506 N.E.2d 1269 (1987).
2. Id. at 139, 506 N.E.2d at 1271.

1988)

Criminal Procedure

ant with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver
after recovering drugs during the search. Lucente filed a motion
to quash the search warrant, alleging that the affiant police officer
intentionally misrepresented information contained in the warrant's affidavit.' The police officer's affidavit alleged that Lucente
sold drugs to a police informant.5 Lucente, however, presented affidavits showing that he was not present at the time of the alleged
sale.6 After making this preliminary showing of the affidavit's falsity, Lucente requested an evidentiary hearing to determine if the
police officer "knowingly or recklessly misled the judicial officer
who issued the search warrant."' 7 Based on the affidavits, the trial
court granted the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing.'
The trial court also ordered the State to produce the police reports
relating to previous cases in which the confidential informant provided information.9 The State failed to produce these reports. 10
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge quashed the search
warrant. I
The State then appealed the trial court's ruling, contending that
3. Id. Lucente was arrested pursuant to an Ilinois law that governs the sale and
possession of cocaine, heroin, morphine, and other similar substances. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 56 1/2, para. 1401 (1985).
4. Lucente, 116 Il1.2d at 140, 506 N.E.2d at 1271. Lucente alleged when the time the
informant purportedly purchased drugs from Lucente, Lucente was at his sister's house.
Id. In support of his alibi, Lucente presented affidavits of people who had seen him at his
sister's house when the alleged sale to the informant took place. Id. at 140, 506 N.E.2d at
1271-72.
5. Id. at 139, 506 N.E.2d at 1271.
6. Id. at 140, 506 N.E.2d at 1271.
7. Id. at 141, 506 N.E.2d at 1272. According to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978), a defendant may attack a search warrant by proving two things. First, the defendant must prove that the officer knowingly or recklessly misrepresented facts to the
judicial officer issuing the search warrant. Second, the defendant must prove that the
misrepresented facts were necessary to the establishment of probable cause. Franks, 438
U.S. at 171-72.
The defendant originally requested a hearing based on the rationale of People v. Garcia, 109 II1. App. 3d 142, 440 N.E.2d 269 (1st Dist. 1982). The Garcia court held that a
warrant should be quashed if it contains any false information. Id. at 145, 440 N.E.2d at
1274. The Lucente court, however, refused to extend Garcia to the protections afforded
by Franks. Id. at 146, 440 N.E.2d at 1274. Franks only provides for invalidating the
warrant if the false statements were necessary to a finding of probable cause. Franks,438
U.S. at 155-56.
8. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 144, 506 N.E.2d at 1272.
9. Id. at 141, 154, 506 N.E.2d at 1272, 1278.
10. Id. at 154, 506 N.E.2d at 1272. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that although
the defendant's showing was not very convincing, the State's failure to turn over these
reports weakened the State's argument and bolstered the defendant's case. Id. at 154, 506
N.E.2d at 1278.
11. Id. at 139, 506 N.E.2d at 1273.
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the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because
the defendant had not made a substantial preliminary showing. 2
Specifically, the State contended that because the defendant's affidavit attacked the veracity of the informant, rather than the veracity of the affiant, the allegations attacking
the search warrant were
3
insufficient under Franks v. Delaware.'
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, holding
that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.' 4 The
court ruled that as long as the defendant's affidavit showed that
someone had lied, either the affiant or informant, the allegations
were sufficient. 5 The court also defined the quantum of proof necessary for a "substantial preliminary showing," holding that the
burden of proof was "somewhere between mere denials . . . and
proof by a preponderance .... ,"t' In Lucente, this burden was met

by the affidavits, which were more than mere denials
because they
7
presented an alibi defense to the alleged sales.'
B. Probable Cause to Arrest
In People v. Cabrera,I8 the police arrested the defendant because
he was identified as a companion of a person who used a murder
victim's checkbook.' 9 After his arrest, the defendant gave the police statements implicating himself in the murder. 20 The defendant
then contended that the police did not have probable cause to
arrest him; and, therefore, that the incriminating statements made
after the arrest were inadmissible in court.2' The trial court disagreed with the defendant.2
12. Id.
13. Id. at 148-49, 506 N.E.2d at 1275 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978)).
14. Id. at 154, 506 N.E.2d at 1278.
15. Id. at 150, 506 N.E.2d at 1275. The court stated "[a]s a preliminary matter, the
defendant cannot be required to establish what an anonymous, perhaps nonexistent informant did or did not say. At the hearing stage, of course, the defendant retains the full
Franks burden of showing that the officer acted intentionally or with reckless disregard
for the truth." Id. at 150, 506 N.E.2d at 1276.
16. Id. at 151-52, 506 N.E.2d at 1276-77.
17. Id. at 154, 506 N.E.2d at 1278.
18. 116 I11.2d 474, 508 N.E.2d 708 (1987).
19. Id. at 480-81, 508 N.E.2d at 709. The defendant was arrested for the murder of a
seventy-four-year-old man. Traveler's checks taken from the victim were used to make
purchases at a clothing store. The store manager identified the defendant out of a mug
shot book. The police subsequently arrested the defendant based on this information. Id.
at 480-81, 508 N.E.2d at 709-10.
20. Id. at 481-82, 508 N.E.2d at 710.
21. Id. at 479, 508 N.E.2d at 709.
22. Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court conceded that the record was devoid
of explicit evidence of probable cause.23 The majority combed the
record, however, to discern information the police might have had
at the time they arrested the defendant.24 Specifically, the court
inferred that, because a witness picked out the defendant's picture
from a mug book, the police must have had knowledge of the defendant's prior burglary conviction. 2- The court concluded that

this fact, along with the witness from the clothing store, could support probable cause.2 6 Justice Simon argued in dissent that probable cause must be demonstrated by facts known to the officer
when he arrested the defendant, and not by what judges assume
the officer probably knew at the time of the arrest.27
III.

A.

SELF-INCRIMINATION

Statements Following an Illegal Arrest

In People v. Franklin,28 the court held that the defendant's postarrest statements should have been suppressed as a result of his
illegal arrest. 29 In Franklin, the police questioned the defendant
about a murder and asked him to take a polygraph examination.30

The defendant agreed to take the polygraph test, but when he
missed his scheduled appointment, the police went to his residence
to bring him to the police station. 3' The defendant spent the remainder of the night in police custody.32 During that night, the
police gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and then gave the
23. Id. at 488, 508 N.E.2d at 711-12.
24. Id. at 488, 508 N.E.2d at 712-13.
25. id.
26. Id. at 488., 508 N.E.2d at 713.
27. Id. at 497, 508 N.E.2d at 718 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon termed the
majority opinion an "innovative concept of appellate review." Id. at 497, 508 N.E.2d at
717 (Simon, J., dissenting). Simon pointed out that the State admitted during oral argument that "it is not in the record what police officer[s] actually knew at the time [they]
arrested the defendant." Id. at 498, 508 N.E.2d at 718 (Simon, J., dissenting). Simon's
dissent criticized the court for filling the gaps in the record with what they, as police
officers, would have done or known. Id. at 497, 508 N.E.2d at 717-18 (Simon, J.,
dissenting).
28. 115 Ill. 2d 328, 504 N.E.2d 80 (1987).
29. Id. at 337, 504 N.E.2d at 84. The seminal case holding that statements made
after an illegal arrest should be suppressed is Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
30. Franklin, 115 Il1.2d at 331, 504 N.E.2d at 81. The defendant was a friend of the
murder victim. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The defendant, however, spent the entire night in an interview room at the
police station. Id. The court noted that there was some confusion about whether the
defendant was ordered or asked to spend the night. Id.
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defendant a polygraph examination.3 a Later, the defendant gave a
written confession after the police took the defendant to the victim's apartment.3 4
The defendant contended that the police lacked probable cause
to arrest him after he missed his scheduled polygraph examination. 35 The defendant argued, therefore, that his statement should
have been suppressed as a result of his illegal arrest.3 6 The State
contended that the defendant voluntarily submitted to the polygraph examination, thus removing any "taint" created by the defendant's illegal arrest." The State argued further that the
continuous giving of the Miranda warnings attenuated the taint of
that arrest.38 The trial court admitted the defendant's statements
into evidence.39
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the defendant's
conviction.4 The court held that the defendant's voluntary submission to the polygraph examination did not purge the taint of the
illegal arrest because the polygraph examination was itself a form
of interrogation. 4'
B.

Involuntary Confessions

In People v. Wilson,2 the police arrested Andrew Wilson for the
murder of two Chicago Police Officers and Wilson remained in police custody for over twelve hours. 3 Wilson contended that the
police inflicted wounds to his chest and face and inflicted burns on
33.

Id. at 333, 504 N.E.2d at 82.

34. Id. at 332, 504 N.E.2d at 81. The police confronted the defendant with the results of his polygraph examination which suggested that his answers were not truthful.
Id. Thereafter, the defendant made a statement implicating himself in the murder. Id.
After being escorted to the victim's apartment, the defendant gave a written confession.

Id.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 334, 504 N.E.2d at 82.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 332, 504 N.E.2d at 81.
40. Id. at 337, 504 N.E.2d at 84. The appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction, Franklin, 130 Ill. App. 3d 1157, 493 N.E.2d 755 (1st Dist. 1984) and the defendant
appealed.
41. Franklin, 115 I1. 2d at 334, 504 N.E.2d at 82. The court stated also that intervening circumstances can operate to attenuate the taint of an illegal detention, but that
none were present. The giving of Miranda warnings, alone, did not "purge the taint of
the illegal arrest." Id. at 337, 504 N.E.2d at 84.
42. 116 Ill. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987).
43. Id. at 32-34, 506 N.E.2d at 572. The defendant was arrested at 5:15 a.m., and was
in custody until 6:00 p.m. when he gave a statement to the police. He was taken to the
hospital later that evening. Id. at 33, 506 N.E.2d at 572.
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his thigh while in police custody. 44 Wilson gave the police a written statement implicating himself in the murders. Wilson contended, however, that he confessed after police officers beat him.4
Wilson, therefore, filed a motion to suppress his confession contending that he made it involuntarily, as evidenced by his injuries. 46 The prosecution conceded that police officers injured
Wilson, but contended that the beatings occurred after the confession .4" The trial court ruled that the defendant voluntarily confessed and that any injuries inflicted upon the defendant occurred

after his confession.4

On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court considered who bears the
burden of proving voluntariness when the issue is not who caused
the injuries, but rather, when the injuries occurred4 9 The Wilson
court answered the question by extending the rule of People v.
LaFrana5° to the instant situation.5 ' The LaFrana rule places
upon the prosecution the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the police did not cause the injuries suffered by
an accused while he is in police custody.52 According to the Wilson court, the same rule applies to the question of when the injuries
occurred. 53 Specifically, the state has the burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence that the injuries occurred after the confession. 54 In Wilson, the State failed to meet this burden and should
have been precluded from introducing Wilson's confession as substantive evidence of his guilt.5 5 The trial court erred, therefore, in
44. Id. at 33-34, 506 N.E.2d at 573. The defendant presented testimony from witnesses at Mercy Hospital, who observed the defendant's head, body, and leg injuries. Id.
at 36-37, 506 N.E.2d at 573-74. The court summarized the defendant's testimony as
follows: "The defendant testified that he was punched, kicked, smothered with a plastic
bag, electrically shocked and forced against a hot radiator throughout the day... until he
gave his confession." Id at 33-34, 506 N.E.2d at 573.
45. Id. at 34-35, 506 N.E.2d at 574. The State presented testimony that the defendant also gave an oral statement on the morning of the arrest. Id.
46. Id. at 33, 506 N.E.2d at 572.
47. Id. at 34-35, 37-38, 506 N.E.2d at 574.
48. Id. at 37-38, 506 N.E.2d at 574. The trial court noted that the defendant did
receive a cut on his face, but found that the police inflicted a cut at the time of his arrest.

Id.
49. Id. at 40, 506 N.E.2d at 576.
50. 4 I1. 2d 261, 122 N.E.2d 583 (1954). In LaFrana,the court held that when it is
conceded, or clearly established that the defendant was injured while in custody "and the
issue is how and why ... [the injuries] were inflicted, we have held that something more
than a mere denial by the police of coercion is required." Id. at 267, 122 N.E.2d at 586.
51. Wilson, 116 I1. 2d at 40, 506 N.E.2d at 575.
52. LaFrana,4 I1. 2d at 267, 122 N.E.2d at 586.
53. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d at 40-41, 506 N.E.2d at 575-76.
54. Id. at 40-41, 506 N.E.2d at 576.
55. Id. at 41-42, 506 N.E.2d at 576. The court concluded that the State had ac-
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denying the defendant's motion to suppress. 6

C.

Confessions and the Material Witness Rule

In People v. Brooks,"5 Barbara Brooks was arrested for the murder of her son. 58 Although she gave a statement incriminating herself in the murder, she moved the trial court to suppress the
statement, claiming that the police and State's Attorneys
threatened to take her children from her if she did not admit to the
killing.59 Additionally, Brooks claimed that her statement was involuntary because of her distress over her son's death.6° At her
suppression hearing, Brooks claimed that the State failed to present two "material witnesses" to the alleged misconduct. 6'
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the failure of these two
witnesses to testify did not violate the material witness rule.62 The
first "material" witness to the alleged misconduct, a youth officer,
was in the hospital during the suppression hearing. 63 The court
held this to be an adequate excuse for his absence from the suppression hearing. 64 Regarding the second witness, an assistant
State's Attorney, the court concluded that, although Brooks had
spoken to the witness during her custody, she did not testify that
the witness "took part in any of the misconduct she allege[d] or

that he was present when any of the threats were uttered ....
The supreme court concluded, therefore, that because the prosecution was not obligated to present the testimony of either witness at
counted for some of the defendant's injuries, but failed to explain others. Id. at 41, 506
N.E.2d at 576. Instead, the State relied upon naked denials of coercion and failed to
explain the other injuries. Id.
56. Id. at 41-42, 506 N.E.2d at 576.
57. 115 I11.
2d 510, 505 N.E.2d at 336 (1987).
58. Id. at 513, 505 N.E.2d at 337. The defendant's husband was also tried for the
murder. At the close of the State's case, the trial judge found him not guilty. Id.
59. Id. at 515, 505 N.E.2d at 338.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 514, 505 N.E.2d at 338. The material witness rule requires that when "the
voluntary nature of a confession is brought into question by a motion to suppress, the
state must produce all material witnesses connected with the taking of the statements or
explain their absence." Id. at 516, 505 N.E.2d at 339 (quoting People v. Armstrong, 51
I1l. 2d 471, 475-76, 282 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1972)).
62. Brooks, 115 Ill.
2d at 518, 505 N.E.2d at 339.
63. Id. at 514, 505 N.E.2d at 339.
64. Id. See also People v. Wright, 24 I11. 2d 88, 180 N.E.2d 689 (1962)("[t]he burden
of proving that a confession is voluntary is one which the State must assume when the
admissibility of a confession is questioned on the grounds that it was coerced. Only by
producing all material witnesses connected with the controverted confession can the State
discharge this burden.").
65. Brooks, 115 II!. 2d at 514, 505 N.E.2d at 339.
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the suppression hearing, the State did not violate the material witness rule.66
D.

Family Visitation and Edwards

In People v. Whitehead,67 the police arrested the defendant for
the murder of a five-year-old girl. 68 In response to Miranda warnings, the defendant asserted his right to counsel. 69 Thereafter, he
made statements to his sister-in-law implicating himself in the
murder. 70 The defendant filed a motion to suppress these statements on the ground that the police interrogated him after he invoked his right to counsel by encouraging his sister-in-law to visit
with him while his attorney was not present.71
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether the police violated the rule of Edwards v. Arizona 72 by permitting the defendant
to visit with his sister-in-law.73 Specifically, the court considered
whether allowing such a visit was an "initiation" of conversation
about the crime by the police.74 If it was an initiation, then the
visit, and the subsequent statement, amounted to a violation of
Edwards."
The supreme court held that the police conduct was not initiation because the police initially refused the visit between the defendant and his sister-in-law, and further, because the police did
not coax the sister-in-law to talk to the defendant.76 Because the
66. Id. at 518, 505 N.E.2d at 339.
67. 116 Il1.2d 425, 508 N.E.2d 687 (1987).
68. Id. at 434, 508 N.E.2d at 689.
69. Id. at 435, 508 N.E.2d at 690. The police questioned the defendant for two hours,
but stopped the questioning when the defendant indicated that he wanted to consult with
an attorney. Id.
70. Id. at 436-37, 508 N.E.2d at 690-91.
71. Id. at 436, 508 N.E.2d at 690.
72. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Edwards operates to prevent the police from "reinitiating"
an interrogation with a suspect after the suspect invokes his right to counsel. Id. at 485.
Once a defendant indicates his right to have an attorney, all questioning must stop until
he either retains an attorney himself or is provided with one by the State. Id. at 485. The
Edwards rule does not apply when the defendant initiates contact with the police. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
73. Whitehead, 116 Il1.2d at 436, 508 N.E.2d at 690.
74. Id. at 436-37, 508 N.E.2d at 690-91. The court phrased the issue in terms of "the
characterization of this conversation with [the sister-in-law]: if the conversation [was]
cast as a form of police interrogation, the statements should have been excluded; otherwise, the defendant's statements were properly admitted." Id. at 437, 508 N.E.2d at 690.
75. Id. at 436-37, 508 N.E.2d at 691.
76. Id. at 437-40, 508 N.E.2d at 690. The court reasoned that Miranda was intended
to guard against police trickery, not against family visitation. Id. at 439, 508 N.E.2d at
691. There was no evidence of trickery presented. Id. The court stated that "[s]o long as
the police have not incited or coerced family members to prompt a confession, it is not a
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police did not use the sister-in-law as an instrument of the State,
the statements were admissible.77
E. References to the Defendant's Refusal to Reduce an Oral
Statement to Writing
In People v. Christiansen,78 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
a prosecutor could make reference to the defendant's refusal to reduce an oral statement to writing, if that oral statement had not
been made in violation of Miranda.79 In Christiansen,a State's Attorney interviewed the defendant after the defendant's arrest for
murder.8 0 During this interview, the defendant gave an oral statement after waiving his right to remain silent."' At trial, the State
presented testimony concerning the defendant's refusal to reduce
his oral statement to writing.8 2 The defendant argued that this
tes83
timony violated his fifth amendment right to remain silent.
The supreme court ruled that testimony about the defendant's
refusal to reduce a confession to writing is impermissible only
when the defendant has invoked his right to remain silent.8 4 Because the defendant had not invoked this right, testimony about his
subsequent silence was properly admitted.8 5
F.

Uncounseled Post-IndictmentStatements

In People v. Patterson,6 the defendant claimed that the trial
court erred in admitting post-indictment statements that he made
outside the presence of an attorney. 7 The issue before the court
was whether waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel must
proper are for judicial intrusion to perpetuate the incommunicado nature of police custody." Id. at 440, 508 N.E.2d at 692.
77. Id. at 437, 508 N.E.2d at 691-92. The court noted that the defendant argued that
his sister-in-law was an instrument of the police. This argument failed because the defendant failed to show that her interests were closely aligned with the police. Id.
78. 116 Ill. 2d 96, 506 N.E.2d 1253 (1987).
79. Id. at 120, 506 N.E.2d at 1263.
80. Id. at 119, 506 N.E.2d at 1262.
81. Id. at 120, 506 N.E.2d at 1263.
82. Id. at 119, 506 N.E.2d at 1259.
83. Id. at 119, 506 N.E.2d at 1262-63.
84. Id. at 120, 506 N.E.2d at 1263 (citing Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S.Ct. at
638-40 (1986)). The court stressed that when the right to remain silent was invoked,
"Any comment at trial upon his subsequent silence constitutes a clear violation of his
rights under the fifth amendment." Id. (emphasis added).

85. Id.
86.
87.

116 Ill.
2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987).
Id. at 297, 507 N.E.2d at 844. In Patterson,the defendant was arrested and later

indicted for a gang-related murder in Evanston, Illinois. Id. at 297, 507 N.E.2d at 84445.
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be governed by a stricter standard than that which applies to the
waiver of counsel under the fifth amendment.18
The court concluded, under the authority of People v. Owens,"9
that a waiver is valid when the evidence shows that the defendant
has been given Miranda warnings and is aware of the gravity of the
offense about which he is to be interrogated 0 In the instant case,
the defendant was given Miranda warnings and was aware that he
had been indicted for murder.9 ' Consequently, his waiver was
valid.

92

IV. GUILTY PLEAS
In People v. Wade, 93 the supreme court addressed whether a trial
court has the jurisdiction to vacate a sentencing order after thirty
days, when the defendant was ineligible for the sentence he received. 94 Reginald Wade pled guilty to robbery as part of a negotiated plea agreement. 95 The trial court sentenced him to a term of
probation. 96 During the probation period, Wade's probation officer discovered that, because of Wade's previous convictions for
armed robbery and rape, probation was not an authorized penalty.97 The trial court vacated the sentence order and allowed
88. Id. at 297-98 507 N.E.2d at 846. The court agreed with the defendant that there
are two separate rights to counsel. One has the right to counsel under the sixth amendment and the right to counsel during interrogation under the fifth amendment. Miranda
warnings are intended to protect the latter right. Id. at 298, 507 N.E.2d at 846.
The court also noted that the United States Supreme Court has reserved ruling on the
question of the differing standards for waiving the right to counsel under the fifth and
sixth amendments, and that opinions in the lower courts are divided. Id. at 299, 507
N.E.2d at 846. Certiorari was granted. 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987).
89. 102 Ill. 2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984). In Owens, the
court held that a defendant could validly waive his sixth amendment right to counsel
without the knowledge that a criminal complaint had been filed. The dispositive issue
was whether the defendant knew the "severity of the situation facing him ...
given] the Miranda warnings. . . ." Id. at 102-03, 464 N.E.2d at 267.

[and was

90. Patterson, 116 Ill. 2d at 299-300, 507 N.E.2d at 847.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 300, 507 N.E.2d at 847.
93. 116 Ill. 2d 1, 506 N.E.2d 954 (1987).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4, 506 N.E.2d at 955.
96. Id. The court sentenced the defendant to thirty-six months probation. Id.
97. Id. This discovery came after the defendant had served nine of the thirty-six
months. Id. The court held that ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5.3(c)(2)(F) applied
to the instant case. Id. at 5, 506 N.E.2d at 955. This section provides that "an offender
shall not receive probation if he has been convicted of a Class 2 or a greater felony in the
10 years preceding the Class 2 or greater felony for which he is being sentenced." ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(c)(2)(F). Because rape is a Class X felony, greater
than a class 2 felony, Wade was ineligible for probation. Wade, 116 111. 2d at 5, 506
N.E.2d at 955.
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Wade to withdraw his earlier plea of guilty.9" Following his conviction, Wade contended that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify or vacate the original sentence order of probation
because thirty days had elapsed before the vacating order.99
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant and
held that the trial court could vacate a void judgment"O at any
time. '01 A trial judge has authority to impose sentences only within
the guidelines set by the legislature.1 0 2 The court concluded that,
by granting probation when it was not authorized, the trial court
acted outside the scope of its authority. Therefore the original pro0 3
bation order was void.1
V.

THE INSANITY DEFENSE: FITNESS HEARINGS

In People v. Lang,"° murder charges were brought against Donald Lang, a visually impaired, deaf mute.0 5 In 1981, the trial court
found Lang unfit to stand trial on a 1971 murder charge, and admitted him to the Departnient of Mental Health under the Mental
Health Code. 06 The court made nine determinations between
1981 and 1985 (concerning Lang's involuntary admission status).'0 7 Each time, the court concluded that Lang's condition met
the criteria for involuntary admission. 08 Since 1981, however, the
State failed to conduct a re-hearing concerning Lang's fitness to
98. Wade, 116 11. 2d at 4, 506 N.E.2d at 955. Wade then was granted a jury trial.
Id. Wade also contended that the sentencing judge should have recused himself. Id. at 7,
506 N.E.2d at 957. The court determined that Wade had an opportunity to make a
motion for a substitution of judge but failed to do so, and that this failure precluded
Wade from claiming error. Id. at 9, 506 N.E.2d at 957.
99. Id. at 4-5, 506 N.E.2d at 955. The defendant argued that the sentence was valid
based on the evidence the trial judge had before himself at the time of sentencing. Id.
100. "A void judgement is one entered by a court without jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter or that lacks the 'inherent power to make or enter the particular
order involved.' " Id. at 5, 506 N.E.2d at 955 (quoting in part R.W. Sawart & Co. v.
Allied Programs Corp., 111 111. 2d 304, 309, 489 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (1986)).
101. Id. at 6, 506 N.E.2d at 956.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 7, 506 N.E.2d at 956. The court rejected the defendant's argument that a
judgment is valid if the information before the court at sentencing supported the judgment. The court responded to this argument by stating that "knowledge of the trial court
that it was exceeding its authority is (not a] prerequisite to a reviewing court's determination that the trial court's judgment was void." Id.
104. 113 Il.2d 407, 498 N.E.2d 1105 (1986).
105. Id. at 414, 498 N.E.2d at 1108.
106. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 1-119 (1985)).
107. Id. at 415, 498 N.E.2d at 1108.
108. Id. The mental health code provides for periodic review of involuntary admission status. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 3-813 (1985).
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stand trial. 1°9 When Lang petitioned the trial court for a formal
hearing on his fitness to stand trial on the murder charge, the trial
court denied his request."' Lang appealed the trial court's
decision. III

On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the
trial court erred in refusing to grant Lang a fitness hearing. 1 2 The
State contended that the defendant was precluded from a fitness
determination because the State had sought involuntary admission
and dismissal of the charges with leave to reinstate." 3 The State
contended that, according to Illinois law, because no charges were
pending, the defendant had no right to a determination
of his fit14
ness to stand trial on non-existent charges.'
The court disagreed with the State and concluded that due process required fitness hearings every twelve months. 5 The court
reasoned first, that the dormant charges constituted a restraint on
the defendant's liberty because the State could reinstate them at
any time.1 1 6 Second, the court reasoned that the charge affected
Lang's quality of life because it limited the type of mental health
109. Lang, 113 Il. 2d at 415, 498 N.E.2d at 1108.
110. Id.
11.
Id. Lang also was involved in other involuntary admissions from which he took
the following appeals: People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311,391 N.E.2d 350 (1979); People ex.
rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970); People v. Lang, 37 IlI. 2d 75,
224 N.E.2d 838 (1967).
112. Lang, 113 I11.2d at 416, 498 N.E.2d at 1108.
113. Id. at 441-42, 498 N.E.2d at 1120-21.
114. Id. at 441-42, 498 N.E.2d at 1120. The statute that the State relied upon pro-

vides in relevant part:
(b) If at any time the court determines that there is a not a substantial
probability that the defendant will become fit to stand trial or to plead within
one year from the date of the original finding of unfitness ...

the State shall

request the court .
(3) To remand the defendant to the custody of the department .. . and

order a hearing to be conducted pursuant to the ... [Mental Health Code]. If
the defendant is committed to the department. . . pursuant to such hearing, the
court having jurisdiction over the criminal matter shall dismiss the charges
against the

defendant with leave to reinstate .

. .

. A former defendant so

committed shall be treated in the same manner as any other civilly committed
patient for all purposes including admission, selection of place of treatment and
the treatment modalities, entitlement to rights and privileges, transfer, and discharge ....

(c) If the defendant is restored to fitness and the original charges against him
are reinstated, the speedy trial provisions of section 103-5 shall commence to
run.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 104-23(b)(3), (c) (1985).
115. Lang, 113 11. 2d at 442-43, 498 N.E.2d at 1120-2i.
116. Id. at 442-44, 498 N.E.2d at 1121-22.
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facility available to him. 1 7 According to the record, private facilities had refused to accept the defendant because of his "forensic
involvement."' 8 The court, therefore, ordered that the trial court
give the respondent a fitness hearing.' 19

VI.
A.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The Trial Stage

In People v. Camden, 20 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
double jeopardy was not a bar to retrial when the defendant implicitly consented to a mistrial declared by the trial judge on the
judge's own motion.' 2' During Julia Camden's trial, the trial judge

learned of one juror's doubt about whether he could remain impartial. 2 2 The judge declared a mistrial, and ordered a retrial without
117. Id. at 444-45, 498 N.E.2d at 1122.
118. Id. The court also considered related issues. First, it held that defendant's first
trial (resulting in a conviction that was reversed because of the defendant's incompetency) was a sufficient "innocent only" determination. Id. An innocent only hearing,
also called a discharge hearing, allows a defendant who has been adjudged unfit to test
the sufficiency of the state's case against him. Id. at 445-46, 498 N.E.2d at 1122. Thus,
the trial court's refusal to conduct another such hearing in 1981 was not error. Id. at
447-48, 498 N.E.2d at 1122-23. Given the passage of time since the first trial, however,
the Illinois Supreme Court in Lang required that an innocent only hearing be held if the
defendant is determined to be unfit for trial and if there is a further determination that
there is "no substantial probability that he will become fit within one year." Id.
Secondly, the court responded to the defendant's contention that the involuntary admission statute was unconstitutionally vague in its definition of mentally ill. Id. at 448,
498 N.E.2d at 1123-24. The court held that the statute did not offend the constitution.
Id. at 456-57, 498 N.E.2d at 1128. The court emphasized that the various categories of
mental illness utilized by psychologists and psychiatrists do not necessarily define mental
illness. Id. at 452, 498 N.E.2d at 1125. The touchstone under the code is not the label on
the illness, but the relationship between the illness and the defendant's ability to function.
Id. at 454-56, 498 N.E.2d at 1126-27. The court defined mental illness for purposes of the
involuntary admission section as follows: "A mentally ill person ... is an individual with
an illness or disorder which substantially impairs the person's thought, perception of
reality, emotional process, judgment, behavior or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." Id. at 455, 498 N.E.2d at 1127. The court concluded that the definition
of mental illness, when viewed in its statutory nexus to danger to self or others, is not
vague. Id. at 456, 498 N.E.2d at 1127.
Finally, the court reviewed the evidence in all consolidated appeals from the various
orders of involuntary admission and concluded that the State met its burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant met the requisite criteria. Id. at 45762, 498 N.E.2d at 1128-30.
119. Id. at 472, 498 N.E.2d at 1135.
120. 115 Ill. 2d 369, 504 N.E.2d 96 (1987).
121. Id. at 379, 504 N.E.2d at 100.
122. Id. at 372-73, 504 N.E.2d at 97. One juror stated that he doubted whether he
could remain impartial because he had a prior drinking problem and the defendant was
using her drinking problem as a defense. Id. at 372, 504 N.E.2d at 97.
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objections by the State or the defense. 21 3 The defendant later made
a motion to bar retrial, contending that a retrial would violate the
defendant's protection against double jeopardy. 124 The trial judge
denied the defendant's 2motion,
finding that the defendant had con5
sented to the mistrial.1

In an interlocutory appeal, the supreme court held that, once a
defendant consents to a mistrial, he cannot later claim constitutional protection against retrial.' 26 To determine whether the defendant consented to the mistrial, the court examined the
defendant's conduct during and after the mistrial ruling. 27 The
court in Camden pointed out that the judge, with agreement of the
defense and the State, set the case for retrial.2 2 The court also
emphasized that the defendant did not object to retrial until two
months after the mistrial was declared. 2 9 Consequently, the court
held that the defendant's conduct amounted to consent and that
30
retrial did not offend double jeopardy principles.

B.

The Death Penalty Sentencing Stage

3
In People v. Ramirez,'1
the defendant was convicted of murder

123. Id. at 374-75, 504 N.E.2d at 98. The court conducted a voir dire of the doubtful
juror. After this voir dire, the trial judge declared a mistrial on his own motion. Id.
124. Id. at 375, 504 N.E.2d at 98. Prior to the filing of his motion to bar further
proceedings, the defendant requested a substitution of judges. This request was granted
and the new judge heard the double jeopardy motion. Id.
125. Id. at 376, 504 N.E.2d at 98. The trial court found that the defendant's actions
amounted to consent. The judge found that the defendant failed to object to the mistrial,
waived a previous demand for a speedy trial, and agreed on a new date for retrial. Id. On
appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court, concluding that the defendant's silence did not amount to consent. People v. Camden, 140 Ill. App. 3d 480, 488 N.E.2d
1082 (5th Dist. 1986).
126. Camden, 115 Ill. 2d at 377-79, 504 N.E.2d at 99. The court quoted the following
standard from Jorn:
[W]here circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial
overreaching, a motion by the defendant for a mistrial is ordinarily assumed to
remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error.
Id. at 377, 504 N.E.2d at 99 (quoting U.S. v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485). The court pointed to
cases in which the Jorn standard has been applied in which the defendant "sought or at
least consented to the mistrial." People ex rel. Roberts v. Orenic, 88 111. 2d 503, 431
N.E.2d 353 (1981); People ex ret. Moseley v. Carey, 74 Il1.2d 527, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979).
127. Camden, 115 Ill. 2d at 377-79, 504 N.E.2d at 99.
128. Id. at 378, 504 N.E.2d at 100.
129. Id. The court noted that the defendant had several opportunities to object to the
mistrial but failed to do so. Id.
130. Id. at 379, 504 N.E.2d at 100.
131. 114 Ill. 2d 125, 500 N.E.2d 14 (1986).
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and sentenced to death. 132 The Illinois Supreme Court, in an earlier opinion, 13 had vacated the death sentence, citing four errors
that deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. 3 4 The
defendant argued that a second death sentence hearing would violate his protection against double jeopardy afforded by the United
35
States and Illinois Constitutions.
The supreme court rejected the defendant's argument. 3 6 The
court conceded that double jeopardy applied to a sentencing hearing. 7 The court also conceded that resentencing would be barred
if the evidence showed that the prosecutor intended to provoke a
mistrial. 3 Ramirez contended that the prosecutor had "purposely" called the victim's widow as a witness when her testimony
was immaterial and that this purposeful conduct evinced the requisite intent. 3 9
The court disagreed, stressing that there was no necessary equation between "purposeful conduct" in offering evidence in error
and intentional provocation of a mistrial. 14 The conduct, therefore, was insufficiently egregious to support4 the inference that the
prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial.' '
132. Id. at 128, 500 N.E.2d at 15.
133. People v. Ramirez, 98 Il1. 2d 439, 457 N.E.2d 31 (1983).
134. 114 Ill. 2d at 128, 500 N.E.2d at 15-16. The four errors the court cited were as
follows:
(1) the trial court had refused to instruct the jury that it was not to consider the
defendant's silence at the hearing; (2) the prosecutor had commented during
closing arguments on the defendant's silence at both stages of the hearing;
(3) during the first stage of the hearing, the prosecutor improperly called the
widow of the deceased as a witness; and (4) the prosecutor had continually
referred to the deceased as being a police officer when that circumstance had
not been invoked as an aggravating factor to qualify the defendant for the death
sentence.
Id.
135. Id. at 129, 500 N.E.2d at 16. The defendant argued:
[T]hat the assurances against double jeopardy in the Constitution of Illinois and
the Constitution of the United States bar the state from again seeking the death
penalty because the prosecutor's errors at the first sentencing hearing would
have justified the trial judge's declaring a mistrial, even though a mistrial was
not declared.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 131, 500 N.E.2d at 17.
137. Id. at 129, 500 N.E.2d at 16.
138. Id. The court derived this standard from Oregon v. Kentucky, 456 U.S. 667
(1982). This approach was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Davis, 112
Ill. 2d 78, 491 N.E.2d 1163 (1986).
139. Ramirez, 114 Il. 2d at 130, 500 N.E.2d at 16.
140. Id. at 131, 500 N.E.2d at 16-17.
141. Id. at 131, 500 N.E.2d at 17. The court refused to respond to the defendant's
other claims of error because the defendant failed to object to them at trial. Id.
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VII.

A.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Implied Consent Hearings

In Koss v. Slater,'42 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that an indigent defendant does not have the right to appointed counsel at an
implied consent hearing. 43 In Koss, Harold Koss was arrested and
charged with driving under the influence ("DUI").' 44 Koss's driving privileges were suspended because he failed to submit to a
breathalyzer examination. 45 Because he was indigent, he requested that counsel be appointed to represent him at the implied
consent hearing. 46 This request was denied after the trial court
decided that the hearings were civil in nature,
and, therefore, the
47
right to appointed counsel did not attach.
The supreme court agreed with the trial court.' 4s The court
based its conclusion that no right to counsel attached to the implied consent hearing on four grounds. First, the court held that
the issues in a DUI proceeding are distinct from those in an implied consent hearing because the latter is not properly considered
part of the criminal process. 49 Second, the court held that the im-

plied consent hearing is not a critical stage of the prosecution be142. 116 Iii. 2d 389, 507 N.E.2d 826 (1987). This case arose from a motion to the
supreme court for a supervisory order directed at the trial judge, David Slater. Id.
143. Id. at 397, 507 N.E.2d at 830. An implied consent hearing is a hearing to determine whether a person who has refused to submit to tests pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1(a) (1985), has properly had his driving privileges suspended.
The statute, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
(a) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
upon the public highway of this State shall be deemed to have given consent,
subject to the provisions of Section 11-501.2, to a chemical test or tests of blood,
breath or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol, other drug, or combination thereof content of such person's blood ....
ILL. REV. STAT.

ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501.1(a)(1985)

(b) Upon notice of statutory summary suspension served under Section 11501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue... Within 30 days after receipt of the written request or the
first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket issued pursuant to a violation of Section 11-501, or similar provision of a local ordinance, the hearings
shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction. This judicial hearing, request or process shall not stay or delay the Gtatutory summary suspension. Such hearings shall proceed in the court in the same manner as in other
civil proceedings.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 2-118.1(b) (1985).
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 11-501(a)(1) (1985).
145. Koss, 116 Ill. 2d at 390, 507 N.E.2d at 826.
146. Id. at 390, 507 N.E.2d at 826-27.
147. Id. at 390, 507 N.E.2d at 827.
148. Id. at 397, 507 N.E.2d at 830.
149. Id. at 393, 507 N.E.2d at 828.
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cause such a hearing is not part of a criminal prosecution.' 50 The
results at an implied consent hearing are not binding on a defendant at a subsequent hearing.' 5 ' Third, the court concluded that an
implied consent hearing is not equivalent to a motion to suppress
because a ruling in an implied consent hearing does not result in
the dismissal of the criminal charges; it only serves to stay the suspension of driving privileges. 52 Finally, the court concluded that
there is no deprivation of liberty involved in suspensions because
no imprisonment is possible.' 5 3 Accordingly, there54 is no right to
appointed counsel in an implied consent hearing.
B. Assistance of Counsel

In People v. Brooks,'55 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
defendant was not deprived of assistance of counsel when the trial
court sequestered her during a recess in her testimony. 56 In
Brooks, the trial court recessed after the defendant's direct testimony. 57 During this recess, the trial court ordered the defendant
sequestered without any communications with counsel.15 Brooks
claimed that this sequestration deprived her of assistance of
counsel. 5 9
6
The supreme court held that the sequestration was not error.1 0
The court noted that the defendant failed to object to the seques150. Id. at 395, 507 N.E.2d at 829. The court noted that the burdens of proof at the
DUI hearing and at the implied consent hearing are different. In an implied consent
hearing, the issues are
whether there is evidence to establish that the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, whether the arresting officer had reasonable
grounds to believe the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol, and
whether the defendant, after being advised by the arresting officer that his license would be suspended if he refused to submit to chemical tests, refused to
submit.
Id. at 394-95, 507 N.E.2d at 829.
The court stated further that the issue in a criminal case is whether the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt "that the defendant was actually under the influence of alcohol while operating a motor vehicle." Id.
151. Id. at 396, 507 N.E.2d at 829.
152. Id. at 396, 507 N.E.2d at 829-30.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 397, 507 N.E.2d at 830.
155. 115 Ill. 2d 510, 510 N.E.2d 336 (1987). See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text for further discussion of Brooks and the issue of whether the State violated the
material witness rule.
156. Id. at 520-21, 505 N.E.2d at 341.
157. Id. at 518, 505 N.E.2d at 340.
158. Id. at 519, 505 N.E.2d at 340.
159. Id. at 518, 505 N.E.2d at 340.
160. Id. at 520, 505 N.E.2d at 341.
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tration.' 6' Moreover, the defendant did not ask to speak to her
lawyer, and her lawyer did not ask to speak to her.1 62 Because the
defendant could show no prejudice resulting from the trial court's
action, the63 supreme court concluded that the trial court acted
properly. 1

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In People v. Kubat,' 64 the defendant alleged in his post-conviction petition that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. 65
The defendant contended that his trial counsel provided ineffective
representation because counsel failed to call alibi witnesses on the
defendant's behalf, failed to move to suppress illegally seized evidence, failed to properly investigate the defendant's case, failed to
failed to consult the defendant
present exculpatory evidence, 66 and
67
on a jury waiver for sentencing.
The supreme court relied on the standards announced in Strickland v. Washington,1 6 and held that the defendant had not been

denied his right to effective assistance of counsel.' 69 The court
ruled that the attorney's alleged failures did not prejudice the defendant. 70 The court noted that the testimony of alibi witnesses
whom the defendant wanted to call had no probative value.1 7' The
court reviewed the search warrant in question and concluded that
probable cause existed to search the defendant's vehicle, and therefore, that the attorney did not err in failing to move to suppress the
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 520-21, 505 N.E.2d at 340-41.
164. 114 I11.2d 424, 501 N.E.2d 111 (1986).
165. Id. at 429, 501 N.E.2d at 112-13. The defendant's conviction for murder and
death sentence was first affirmed in People v. Kubat, 94 Iii. 2d 437, 447 N.E.2d 247, cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983).
166. Id. at 429, 501 N.E.2d at 113.
167. Id. The defendant cited Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), as support
for his contention that he should have been allowed to make fundamental decisions regarding the proceedings. Kubat, 114 Ill. 2d at 429, 501 N.E.2d at 117.
168. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires that a defendant make two showings in
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The defendant first must show that his counsel's
performance was deficient. The second prong of the Strickland test requires the defendant
to show that, in the absence of counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been
different. 466 U.S. at 687.
169. Kubat, 114 Ill. 2d at 430-39, 501 N.E.2d at 115-18.
170. Id. at 432-39, 501 N.E.2d at 115-18.
171. Id. at 433, 501 N.E.2d at 115. The court disagreed with the defendant's characterizing his attorney's failures as "shocking and inexplicable." Id. at 433, 501 N.E.2d at
115.
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evidence seized during the search. 172 The other errors were
dis73

missed by the court as either strategic or not prejudicial.
In People v. Hall,174 Anthony Hall, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Institute, was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. 75 Hall requested that the court appoint an attorney other
than the public defender.' 76 Hall then expressed his desire to proceed pro se, and the trial court held a conference, with Hall and his
public defender present. 77 During this conference, Hall struck the
public defender on the head with a chair and struck the trial judge
on the head with his fist.' 78 The defendant contended that the failure to appoint new counsel
after the incident denied him effective
79
assistance of counsel.1

The supreme court disagreed with the defendant and ruled that,
according to Illinois law, an indigent defendant may obtain counsel
other than a public defender if he makes a showing of actual preju-

dice by continued representation.180 The court reasoned that, the

defendant not only failed to make this showing, but also, "embarked on a deliberate course designed to delay and disrupt his
trial."''

VIII.
A.

TRIAL PRACTICE

The Right to Speedy Trial

In People v. Arnhold,'12 the defendant claimed that he was denied his statutory right to a speedy trial.' 83 The defendant was
172. Id. at 436, 501 N.E.2d at 115.
173. Id. at 432-39, 501 N.E.2d at 115-18.
174. 114 Ill. 2d 376, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986).
175. Id. at 385, 499 N.E.2d at 1337. The defendant was convicted of murdering a
civilian employee of the inmate kitchen. Id. at 386, 499 N.E.2d at 1337.
176. Id. at 386-87, 499 N.E.2d at 1337-33.
177. Id. at 389, 499 N.E.2d at 1339.
178. Id. at 389-90, 499 N.E.2d at 1339.
179. Id. at 401, 499 N.E.2d at 1344-45.
180. Id. at 402, 499 N.E.2d at 1344-45. The relevant statute provides that a defendant is entitled to the appointment of other counsel when he can establish good cause.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 113-3(b) (1985). This is a discretionary appointment. The
courts have held that good cause requires a showing of prejudice. People v. Clark, 108
Ill. App. 3d 1071, 440 N.E.2d 387 (1st Dist. 1982).
181. Hall, 114 111.2d at 404, 499 N.E.2d at 1346. A defendant is estopped from
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel when the claim arises from lack of cooperation.
People v. Myles, 86 11. 2d 260, 427 N.E.2d 59 (1981).
182. 115 Ill. 2d 379, 504 N.E.2d 100 (1987).
183. Id. at 381, 504 N.E.2d at 101. This appeal followed the defendant's conviction
for aggravated kidnapping and conspiracy to commit theft charges. Id.
The statutory right to a speedy trial is found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 103-5 et.
seq. The pertinent parts are as follows:
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released on bond on the charge at issue and was later arrested for
an unrelated charge.8 4 Thereafter, the defendant remained in custody. 1' He withdrew his bond from the first charge after approximately one month. 186 The defendant argued that the one month
custody on the unrelated charge should have counted as custody
for the first charge,
even though his bond was still in effect during
87
that period. 1

The supreme court reasoned that a defendant's right to a speedy
trial on a particular charge is determined by his custody status on
that charge.'
Arnhold was not in custody on the initial charge
until he withdrew his bond. 8 9 The one month incarceration on the
second charge, therefore, did not count in the speedy trial computation for the first charge.19°
B.

Severance

91 the

In People v. Duncan,'
defendant claimed that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to sever certain counts and to sever
(a) Every person in custody in this State for an offense shall be tried by the
court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant...
(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having
jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless the
delay is occasioned by the defendant...
(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands trial upon more
than one charge pending against him in the same county, he shall be tried or
adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of the period prescribed by subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Section.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 103-5(a),(b),(e) (1979).
184. Arnhold, 115 111. 2d at 381, 504 N.E.2d at 101. On June 3, 1980, the defendant
was arrested for aggravated kidnapping and conspiracy to commit theft. He posted bond
on July 18, 1980. On July 24, 1980, he was arrested on unrelated charges. He turned in
his bond, or surrendered the bond, for the kidnapping and conspiracy charges on August
21, 1980. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 383, 504 N.E.2d at 101.
188. Id at 383-84, 504 N.E.2d at 101-02.
189. Id. at 384, 504 N.E.2d at 102.
190. Id.
191. 115 Ill. 2d 429, 505 N.E.2d 307, rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 53 (1987). The Supreme Court
reversed the judgement and remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987) ("We hold that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's
confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the confession is redacted to
eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any reference to her existence."). The defendant was convicted in a joint trial with his co-defendant, Perry Olinger. Olinger's
appeal is at 112 11. 2d 324, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986).
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the trial of his co-defendant. 9 2 In Duncan, the prosecution arose
out of a series of murders.' 9 3 The defendant claimed that the
events that led up to the deaths of the two victims were not sufficiently related to be joined in the same indictment. 94 The defendant also claimed that, because the prosecution introduced his codefendant's statement implicating him in the murders, and because
the co-defendant did not testify at trial, he was denied his right to
confront the witnesses against him, as provided for in Bruton v.
United States.' 95
The Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the admission of
a statement that implicates only the defendant, but does not directly accuse him, constitutes a Bruton violation. 96 The court concluded that, on the facts in Duncan, mere implication was sufficient
to raise the Bruton danger. 97 The State lacked direct evidence of
the defendant's guilt, and the non-testifying co-defendant's statement was used to implicate the defendant. 98 The court stated that
the defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the
co-defendant,
although the co-defendant's statement implicated
19 9
him.
In People v. Byron,2m the supreme court held that the trial court
erred by denying a defense request for a severance. 20 1 The defendant claimed that, because the co-defendant's defense was anLagonistic to his defense and because the evidence to be introduced at
192. Duncan, 115 Il1. 2d at 439-40, 505 N.E.2d at 311.
193. Id. at 432-38, 505 N.E.2d at 308-11.
194. Id. at 439, 505 N.E.2d at 311.
195. Id. at 442, 505 N.E.2d at 311 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 123
(1968)). Bruton dealt with the prejudice that results when a co-defendant's out-of-court
statement inculpating the defendant is used in the defendant's trial and the co-defendant
does not take the stand. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123. In Bruton, the Supreme Court held
that a severance should be granted because the defendant's right to confront witnesses
through cross-examination was violated when he could not compel his codefendant to
testify. Id. at 126-28. He therefore cannot cross-examine the statement that is being used
against him. Id. at 136.
196. Duncan, 115 Ii. 2d. at 443, 505 N.E.2d at 313. The court said "[w]e must
consider whether the challenged statements sufficiently implicate the defendant in the
crimes to warrant examination under Bruton." Id.
197. Id. at 443-44, 505 N.E.2d at 313.
198. Id. at 444, 505 N.E.2d at 313. The court said about direct evidence of the defendant's guilt: "[w]e note that the record does not disclose direct evidence against the
defendant." Id.
199. Id. This was relevant because a co-defendant was accused of striving to take
over the local drug trade and was "willing to rob and kill those presently involved ......
Id. at 443, 505 N.E.2d at 313.
200. 116 Il1.2d 81, 506 N.E.2d 1247 (1987). A co-defendant's case was reversed in
People v. Bean, 109 11. 2d 80, 485 N.E.2d 349 (1985).
201. Byron, 116 11. 2d at 94, 506 N.E.2d at 1250.
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trial "overwhelmingly implicated" the defendant, a severance was
necessary to insure a fair trial.20 2 The supreme court agreed with
the defendant's contentions. 20 3 Reasoning that the trial became
"more of a contest between the two defendants than between the
People and each defendant," the court concluded that a severance
was required to give Byron a fair trial.2 '
In People v. Thomas,2 ° s the supreme court also considered a denial of a severance motion.2° In Thomas, an Assistant State's At.
torney testified about the co-defendant's statement and referred to
Thomas. 20 7 The defendant claimed he was prejudiced by this testimony. 208 The court reviewed the co-defendant's statement and
noted that, although it placed the defendant at the scene of the
murder, his own confession also placed him at the murder scene. 2° 9
Moreover, unlike Bruton, there was other significant evidence of
the defer tant's presence. 2 '0 The co-defendant's confession, therefore, did not "add sutbstantial . . . weight to the government's
case."211

C

ProsecutorialMisconduct

In People v. Sanchez, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a
claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 1 3 Specifically, the defendant
202. Id. at 90-91, 506 N.E.2d at 1251.
203. Id. at 94, 506 N.E.2d at 1251.
204. Id. at 93, 506 N.E.2d at 1251. Although ruling that Byron was entitled to a
severance, the court noted the general rule that "defendants jointly indicted are to be
tried together unless fairness to one defendant requires a separate trial to avoid prejudice." Id. (quoting People v. Lee , 87 II1. 2d 182, 429 N.E.2d 461 (1981)).
205. 116 11. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987). See also supra notes 86-92 and accompa-

nying text for a discussion of issues relating to post-indictmert uncounseled statements.
206.

Id. at 300, 507 N.E.2d at 847.

207. Id. at 302, 507 N.E.2d at 848. The co-defendant's statement implicated the defendant by placing him at the scene of the murder. Id.
208. Id. at 301, 507 N.E.2d at 847. The defendant claimed that the admission of the
co-defendant's statement that implicated him violated Bruton. Id. For a discussion of
Bruton, see supra note 195.
209. Id. at 302-303, 507 N.E.2d at 847.
210. Id. at 303, 507 N.E.2d at 848. Specifically, the court noted that Thomas, by his
own statement, placed himself at the murder scene. Id.
211. Id. at 303, 507 N.E.2d at 848. The court also noted that the State presented
other evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id.
212. 115 Ill. 2d 238, 503 N.E.2d 277 (1986).
213. Id. at 266, 278, 503 N.E.2d at 287, 292. The defendant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. The defendant then sought relief under section 2-1401 of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1985). His postconviction petition was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing. He appealed this dismissal and the supreme court transferred the appeal to the supreme court and consolidated it with the direct appeal from the trial court. Id. at 251-52, 503 N.E.2d at 280.
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claimed that the prosecutor failed to call a witness listed on the
prosecutor's list of potential witnesses.21 4 The defendant claimed
also that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined the defendant
at the sentencing phase of the proceedings by asking him to tell the
jury why he should not be put to death for the "savage" and "sadistic" murder. 21 5 The prosecutor asked also if the defendant
the victim was sodomized was "ugly and
thought the way in which
21 6
brutal and despicable.

Addressing the defendant's first claim, the court responded that
the State need not call all of its listed potential witnesses.21 7 The
court held that if any of the witnesses were essential to the defendant's case, the defendant could call those witnesses. 2 8 Also,

though finding that the prosecutor probably was "overzealous" in
his cross-examination of the defendant, the court held that the trial
court has discretion to grant "wide latitude" to the prosecutor.21 a
D. Jury Selection
In People v. Whitehead220 and People v. Sanchez,221 the defendants claimed that the exclusion of jurors for cause because of their
opposition to the death penalty denied the defendants a fair jury
trial.222 The supreme court disagreed, in light of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Lockhart v. McCree.22 a Lockhart held
that the practice of examining jurors to determine their feelings
about the death penalty, in )rder to excuse for cause those who are
unalterably opposed to the death penalty, does not violate either
214. Id. at 266, 503 N.E.2d at 887. The defendant contended that in anticipation of
the testimony of one of the State's potential witnesses, he did not object to certain testimony of other State witnesses. He stated that he planned on cross-examining one of the
State's witnesses to counter certain testimony of other witnesses. Id.
215. Id. at 279-80, 503 N.E.2d at 293.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 266-67, 503 N.E.2d at 287. The court noted that the purpose of Rule 412,
requiring the state to list potential witnesses, is to "combat surprise and afford an opportunity to combat false testimony." Id. (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 412).
218. Id. at 267, 503 N.E.2d at 287.
219. Id. at 281, 503 N.E.2d at 294. The court stated that the appropriate standard of
review of prosecutorial conduct is whether "manifest prejudice resulted" from that conduct. Id. at 281 (citing People v. Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 478, 363 N.E.2d 801 (1977)).
220. 116 Il1.2d 425, 508 N.E.2d 687 (1987). See also supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
221. 115 Ill. 2d 238, 503 N.E.2d 277 (1986). See also supra notes 212-19 and accompanying text.
2d at 265-66,
222. Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 449, 508 N.E.2d at 696; Sanchez, 115 Ill.
503 N.E.2d at 286.
2d at 265-66,
223. Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 449, 508 N.E.2d at 696; Sanchez, 115 Ill.
503 N.E.2d at 286 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.Ct. 1758 (1986)).
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453

the defendant's right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community or the right to an impartial jury. 224 According to
Lockhart, there is no violation of the fair cross section requirement
because those jurors who are absolutely opposed to the death penalty are not a distinctive group in the community. 225 As for the
right to an impartial jury, the court reiterated its previous holdings
in other. cases that there is no evidence that juries examined concerning 6their ability to vote for the death penalty are conviction
prone.

22

E. Substitution of Judges
In People v. Hall,227 the defendant, Anthony Hall struck the
trial judge in a closed door conference room, outside the presence
of the jury. 228 The defendant argued that the judge was obligated
to recuse himself after this incident. 229 The court noted that a defendant is entitled to a substitution of judges when he is able to
establish prejudice by the trial judge's refusal either to recuse himself or to transfer the case to another judge. 230 The court held that
224. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. at 1766.
225. Id. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), the Supreme Court espoused the
elements a defendant needs to show for a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.
439 U.S. at 364. These elements of a prima facie showing are:
(1) That the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in the venires from which juries
are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons
in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
Id.
226. Sanchez, 115 Ill. 2d at 265, 503 N.E.2d at 286.
227. 114 Ill. 2d 376, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986). See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of issues relating to ineffective assistance of counsel in Hall.
228. Id. at 390, 499 N.E.2d at 1339. The trial judge related the incident as follows:
[I]et the record show that the defendant has now been. removed and that the
prosecution is now present in chambers and that we are outside the presence of
the jury and the persons assembled in the courtroom, and let the record further
show that defense counsel, Steven Skelton has just been struck on the head by
the defendant with a chair and that the court has also been struck by the defendant on the head with his fists.
Id.
229. Id. at 405-06, 499 N.E.2d at 1346.
230. Id. at 406, 499 N.E.2d at 1346. The court noted that ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38,
para. 114-5(c) (1963), created an absolute right for a substitution of judges if the defendant makes a motion within ten days of the case being placed on the judge's docket. After
the ten day period, a defendant is entitled to a transfer if he can establish "cause." Hall,
114111. 2d at 406, 499 N.E.2d at 1346. In People v. Vance, 76 111. 2d 171, 390 N.E.2d 867
(1979), the court held that the burden for establishing cause rests on the defendant, not
on the trial judge. Id. at 178, 390 N.E.2d at 870. The determination of prejudice is usually left to the court's discretion. People v. Polk, 55 11. 2d 327, 303 N.E.2d 137 (1973).
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the defendant failed to establish such prejudice. 23 ' The court
stated that the "record fails to show any unfairness to the defendant or even want of evenhandness. ' ' 23 2 The court reasoned that to
reverse a case on these grounds would be to invite angry defendants to commit this type of assault.233
F. Jury Waiver
In Hall,234 the defendant also claimed that he did not waive a
jury for his death sentencing hearing knowingly or intelligently. 235
The defendant argued that he would not have waived a jury if he
had been admonished, by the trial court or by counsel, that the
jury's sentencing recommendation must be unanimous.236 The
court concluded that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived the jury for the sentencing hearing. 237 The court responded
that the defendant had continuously asserted his desire to have the
judge, not the jury, decide his case.238
G.

Change of Venue

In People v. Lego,239 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request for a
change of venue. 24 The defendant was charged with the murder of
an eighty-two-year-old woman. 241 The defendant argued that, because of extensive pretrial publicity, he could not receive a fair
trial.242 Although three of the jurors admitted that they had heard
231. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d at 406-07, 499 N.E.2d at 1347.
232. Id. at 406, 499 N.E.2d at 1347. The court also noted that the defense counsel
and the trial judge "carried out their responsibilities with professional competence, and,
considering the circumstances, even grace." Id. at 407, 499 N.E.2d at 1347.
233. Id.
234. 114 Ill. 2d 376, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986).
235. Id. at 411, 499 N.E.2d at 1349. The defendant cited People v. Albanese, 104 I1.
2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984), which held that the requirements of knowing and intelligent jury waiver apply to capital sentencing hearings. Id. at 534, 473 N.E.2d at 1260.
236. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d at 411, 499 N.E.2d at 1349.
237. Id. at 411-14, 499 N.E.2d at 1349. In other cases, the court has held that a trial
court is not required to advise defendants at death sent-ncing hearings of the "unanimityof-decision" requirement before a jury waiver is accepted. See, e.g., People v. Albanese,
104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984); People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 404 N.E.2d
1815 (1980).
238. Hall, 114 11. 2d at 412, 499 N.E.2d at 1349.
239. 116 Ill. 2d 323, 507 N.E.2d 800 (1987).
240. Id. at 334, 507 N.E.2d at 804.
241. Id. at 332-33, 507 N.E.2d at 802.
242. Id. at 333, 507 N.E.2d at 802. The defendant contended that three jurors admitted having heard about this case through the media. The defendant argued that these
outside influences deprived him of a fair trial. Id. The defendant cited Nebraska Press
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about the case, they all stated that they would decide the defendant's guilt or innocence based upon the evidence presented at
1 The supreme court held that, because each juror
trial.243
demonstrated an ability to render a verdict based on the evidence, and not
on the publicity given the case, the defendant received a fair
trial. 244
IX.

SENTENCING

A. Factors Used in Sentencing
In People v. White,245 the defendant, Frank White contended
that the trial court erred in using the victim's age as a factor in
sentencing him for a crime in which the victim's age was an element of the offense. 246 The defendant was convicted of aggravated
battery of a child,247 and during sentencing the trial judge used the

fact that the victim was under the age of twelve years as an aggravating factor in imposing sentence.248
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the defendant.249 The

court relied on People v. Conover,250 which held that, "in determining the appropriate range of punishment for a criminal offense, the
legislature must necessarily have considered the factors inherent in
the offense." 25' Applying the reasoning in Conover, the court held
that the trial court erred by considering the victim's age when sentencing the defendant for an offense in which the elemepts take
into account the victim's age.252
In People v. Saldivar,253 the defendant was sentenced to seven
Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), for the proposition that pretrial publicity can
deprive a defendant of a fair trial. Lego, 116 Il1.2d at 333, 507 N.E.2d at 802.
243. Lego, 116 Il1.2d at 334, 507 N.E.2d at 802-03.
244. Id. at 334, 507 N.E.2d at 803-04. The court also noted that the three jurors
questioned by the defendant were not challenged by the defendant during voir dire. Id.
245. 114 II1. 2d 61, 499 N.E.2d at 467 (1986).
246. Id. at 65, 499 N.E.2d at 469.
247. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-4.3 (1983).
248. White, 114 I11.
2d at 64, 499 N.E.2d at 468. The defendant was convicted of
aggravated battery of his nine-year-old son. The trial court sentenced him to four years in
prison. Id.
249. Id. at 65, 68, 499 N.E.2d at 469, 470.
250. 84 I11. 2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906 (1981).
251. White, 114 Il1.2d at 66, 499 N.E.2d at 469 (citing People v. Conover, 84 Ill. 2d
400, 419 N.E.2d 906 (1981)).
252. White, 114 Ill. 2d at 66, 499 N.E.2d at 470. Although the court found that the
trial judge erred in considering the victim's age, it decided not to remand for resentencing. The court noted that the trial judge did not rely primarily upon age as a factor. Id.
at 66-68, 499 N.E.2d at 470.
253. 113 Il1.2d 256, 497 N.E.2d 1138 (1986).
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years imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter following a stipulated bench trial on the charge of murder.254 The defendant
claimed that the Conover rule was violated when the trial court
stated that it was relying on the harm caused to the victim - his
death - as the principle aggravating factor in sentencing.2 5
The supreme court agreed, and reduced the sentence to the minimum period of four years.256 The court reasoned that harm to the
victim could be an aggravating factor in a sentencing determination for voluntary manslaughter, but only when the trial court considered it under the rubric of harm, "the force employed and the
physical manner in which the victim's death was brought
about. ' 25 7 In Saldivar, the trial judge considered the fact of death
258
itself.
B.

Creditfor Time in Custody

In Moore v. Strayhorn,259 Ike Moore sued the trial judge for refusing to grant him credit for the time he had already spent in
custody on the charge for which he was sentenced. 260 After exercising its discretionary supervisory authority to review, 26' -the Illinois
Supreme Court held that, according to Illinois law,262 a sentencing
judge is required to give the defendant credit for time spent in custody for the offense for which he is sentenced.26 a The court issued
a supervisory order, directing the circuit court to give the defendant credit for time spent in custody in accordance with Illinois
law. 2 4
254. Id. at 259-60, 497 N.E.2d at 1138-39.
255. Id. at 264, 497 N.E.2d at 1142. The primary factor that the trial judge relied
upon was "the terrible harm that was caused the victim." Id. at 266, 497 N.E.2d at 1140.
The court also noted that the trial judge "mentioned that the defendant's conduct caused
the death and that a human life was taken." Id.
256. Id. at 272, 497 N.E.2d at 1144-45.
257. Id. at 271, 497 N.E.2d at 1143-44 (citing People v. Andrews, 105 Ill. App. 3d
1109, 435 N.E.2d 706 (5th Dist. 1982) and People v. Hughes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 352, 440
N.E.2d 432 (5th Dist. 1982)).
258. Saldivar, 113 Il1. 2d at 272, 497 N.E.2d at 1144.
259. 114 Ill. 2d 538, 502 N.E.2d 727 (1986).
260. Id. at 540, 502 N.E.2d at 728.
261. The court noted that "we improvidently granted leave to file such a petition...
because Moore should have been left to his alternative remedy of appealing the sentencing order to the appellate court. Id.
262. The relevant statute provides in part as follows: "the offender should be given

credit ... for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
imposed." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-7(b)(1985).
263.

Moore, 114 111. 2d at 542, 502 N.E.2d at 728.

264. Id.
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C.

Challenges to the Length of Sentence

In People v. Barrios,265 the defendant contested the length of his
sentence.266 Following a conviction for perjury and driving on a
revoked license, the defendant was sentenced to four years incarceration.267 The defendant argued that the "sentence [was] disproportionate to the offense. ' 26 As support for his argument, the
defendant cited City of Evanston v. Connelly,269 in which the court

sentenced the defendant to forty-five days for falsifying a driver's
license application.270

The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the sentence. 271 The court distinguished this
case from Connelly.27 In Connelly, the conviction was not for perjury, unlike the instant case. 3 Also in Connelly, unlike the defendant in Barrios, the defendant had no prior criminal history. 4 The
court ruled, therefore, that if a sentence is within the statutory
limit, "[it will] not be disturbed unless it is greatly at variance with
the purpose and spirit of the law ....
D. Delay in Serving the Sentence
In Crump v. Lane,276 the defendant contended that he should be
excused from serving his sentence because there was a six year delay between the affirmance of his conviction and the issuance of the
mittimus. 277 Michael Crump was convicted in 1974 for armed robbery.278 He appealed this conviction and it was subsequently af265. 114 III. 2d 265, 500 N.E.2d 415 (1986).
266. Id. at 276, 500 N.E.2d at 419.
267. Id. at 268, 500 N.E.2d at 415. The perjury conviction was based on the defendant's having lied on a driver's license application. He was sentenced to four years for the
perjury. He was sentenced to 364 days for driving on a revoked license. Id.
268. Id. at 276, 499 N.E.2d at 419.
269. 73 Ill. App. 3d 890, 392 N.E.2d 211 (1st Dist. 1979).
270. Barrios, 114 III. 2d at 276, 500 N.E.2d at 419. The defendant argued that
lengthy sentences for perjury are appropriate only in major trials. The defendant also
pointed to a prior armed robbery conviction for which he had only received a five year
sentence. By comparison, he asserted his sentence was too severe. Id.
271. Id. at 276, 500 N.E.2d at 420.
272. Id. at 276-77, 500 N.E.2d at 419.
273. Id. at 276, 500 N.E.2d at 419.
274. Id. at 276-77, 500 N.E.2d at 420.
275. Id. at 277, 500 N.E.2d at 420.
276. 117 Ill.
2d 181, 510 N.E.2d 893 (1987).
277. Id. at 183, 510 N.E.2d at 894. A mittimus is an order from the court remanding
the defendant to the custody of the sheriff, or an order affirming a conviction. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 904 (5th Ed. 1979).
278. Crump, 117 Iil. 2d at 182, 510 N.E.2d at 894.
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firmed.279 The defendant later was arrested and convicted on an
unrelated charge of aggravated battery, six years after his first conviction was affirmed. 280 At the sentencing hearing on the aggravated battery charge, the State became aware of the 1974
conviction and of the defendant's failure to serve the sentence.28'
The defendant sought habeas corpus relief on the armed robbery
charge.282 He claimed that the delay was attributable to the State
because his attorney had told him the conviction had been reversed
and because he had received a refund of his bond.283
The supreme court affirmed the denial of the defendant's habeas
corpus application.284 Relying on its recent decision in Walker v.
Hardiman 85 the court held that because the affirmance of the
armed robbery conviction was promptly filed and entered into the
record and because Crump's lawyer was notified of the affirmance,
the delay was chargeable to the defendant.286 The court emphasized that one of the conditions of bond is that the defendant surrender himself upon affirmance of a conviction.287 The court stated
that "[i]t was Crump's responsibility to comply with the conditions
'288
of his bail, not the state's to see that he did.
E. Refusal to Allow the Defendant to Speak
Before Imposing Sentence
In People v.Christiansen,289 the defendant contended that the
trial court violated his due process guarantees by refusing him a
279. Id.
280. Id. at 183, 510 N.E.2d at 894.
281. Id. at 182, 510 N.E.2d at 894. The defcndant falsely testified that this conviction was reversed on appeal. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 183, 510 N.E.2d at 894.
284. Id. at 185, 510 N.E.2d at 894.
285. 116 Il. 2d 413, 507 N.E.2d 849 (1987). In Walker, the defendant's conviction
was affirmed and his attorney was notified of the affirmance. The delay between the
affirmance and the date Walker surrendered was five years. Walker did not get his bond
returned to him, unlike Crump. Nor was Walker subsequently arrested for another
crime, unlike Crump. The court held that the defendant could not escape his sentence by
showing that the State failed to notify him to surrender. Id.
286. Crump, 117 Il.2d at 184, 510 N.E.2d at 894.
287. Id. at 185, 510 N.E.2d at 895. The bail statute requires a defendant whose conviction has been affirmed to surrender himself to the court immediately. ILL. REV. STAr.
ch. 38, para. I 10-10(b)(5) (1985).
288. Id.
289. 116 Ill.
2d 96, 506 N.E.2d 1253 (1987). See also supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of issues relating to comments on the defendant's refusal to
reduce an oral statement to writing.
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chance to speak2 90 before imposing sentence.2 9 1 The defendant argued also that this was a violation of equal protection because noncapital defendants are afforded this right by statute, and capital
292
defendants are not.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with these arguments. 93
Relying on Hill v. United States,294 the court held that allocution is
not a fundamental right guaranteed by due process. 29 Because it is
not a fundamental right, its denial to capital defendants
does not
2 96
deny those defendants equal protection of the laws.
F

Death Penalty Issues

1. Qualification for the Death Penalty
In People v. Guest, 97 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a California murder conviction could constitute an aggravating factor to
qualify the defendant for the death penalty under the Illinois statute. 298 The defendant claimed that it was error to use the Califor290.

The chance to speak before imposition of sentence is referred to as the right of

allocution.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

70 (5th Ed. 1979).

291. Christiansen, 116 I1. 2d at 127, 506 N.E.2d at 1266. The defendant contended
that "the right to make such a statement is 'part of our concept of ordered liberty [so] as
to constitute part of the due process guarantee.'" Id.
292. Id. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-4-1(a)(5) (1981), which provides, in
relevant part, "(a) Except when the death penalty is sought under hearing procedures
otherwise specified, after a determination of guilt a hearing shall be held to impose the
sentence .... At the hearing the court shall: ... (5) afford the defendant the opportunity
to make a statement on his behalf. .. ."
293. Christiansen, 116 II1.2d at 129, 506 N.E.2d at 1266.
294. 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
295. The court quoted the following from Hill: "[tlhe failure of a trial court to ask a
defendant ... whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed . . . is ruit a
fundamental which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Christiansen, 116 Ill.
2d at 128, 506 N.E.2d at 1266-67 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. at 428).
296. Christiansen, 116 Il. 2d at 129, 506 N.E.2d at 1266-67. The supreme court
noted that courts give deference to the legislature "unless the classification either impinges on some right deemed fundamental or [is] directed against a 'suspect' class." Id.
(quoting People v. Gaines, 88 Il1. 2d 342, 380, 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1065 (1981)).
297. 115 I1. 2d 72, 503 N.E.2d 255 (1986).
298. Id. at 102, 503 N.E.2d at 269. The Illinois statute provides as follows:
(b) Aggravating factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of
the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of
the offense of murder may be sentenced to death if : ... 3. The defendant has
been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of
this Section or under any law of the United States which is substantially similar
to Subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as
the result of the same act so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent
to kill more than one person or of separate premeditated acts.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(3) (1985).
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nia conviction because the mental states required for murder in
California and Illinois differed and also because the California
murder occurred after the Illinois murder.2 99
The court rejected these claims, holding that the murder statutes
are "substantially similar" enough to qualify the defendant for the
death penalty."° The court held also that it was immaterial that
30 1
the California murder occurred after the Illinois murder.
2.

Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute
In Guest, 0 2 the court addressed also the constitutionality of the
Illinois Death Penalty Statute.3 0 3 The defendant first claimed that
the death penalty gave the State's Attorney "discretionary authority to seek the death penalty."' 3 1 The defendant next claimed that
the sentencing procedure is arbitrary and provides no review of
whether it is proportionate to the penalty given in other death
cases.30 5 Next, the defendant claimed that the statute places on the
defendant the burden of proving the inappropriateness of death as
a punishment, and the sentencer does not have to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. 3 0 6 Finally, the defendant contended
that the state is not required to prove the absence of mitigating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.30 7
The court has dealt with each of the foregoing issues in previous
cases and dismissed each of the defendant's claims. 308 In generally
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty statute, the
299. 115 Ill.
2d Id. at 92-103, 503 N.E.2d at 263-69. The defendant argued that the
California murder statute under which he was previously convicted is not "substantially
similar" to the Illinois murder statute, as required by ILL. REV. STAT. ch.38, para. 91(b)(3). Id. at 93, 503 N.E.2d at 263. The principal difference he cited was that murder in
Illinois requires proof of intent or knowledge, whereas murder in California requires
proof of malice aforethought. The defendant argued that malice aforethought is no
longer used in Illinois. Id. at 96, 503 N.E.2d at 266.
300. Id. at 95, 503 N.E.2d at 269.
301. Id. at 103, 503 N.E.2d at 273.
302. 115 Ill. 2d 72, 503 N.E.2d 255 (1987).
303. Id. at 109-13, 503 N.E.2d at 272-74.
304. Id. at 109, 503 N.E.2d at 272. The defendant's argument is based on the separation of powers doctrine. He claimed that this authority "delegates judicial functions to
the executive branch." Id.
305. Id. at 110, 503 N.E.2d at 273.
306. Id. at 112, 503 N.E.2d at 273.
307. Id.
308. In rejecting the argument that the statute arbitrarily imposes the death penalty,
the court cited People v. Kubat, 94 11. 2d 437, 447 N.E.2d 247 (1983)(the Illinois Death
Penalty Statute limits and directs the discretion of the sentencer and provides for meaningful appellate review as required in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
In rejecting the defendant's argument that the death penalty is unconstitutional because it places on the defendant the burden to prove that death is an inappropriate pun-
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court relied upon Gregg v. Georgia,3 9 which held that "a death
penalty statute is valid if it limits and directs the discretion of the
sentencer and provides for meaningful appellate review. 3a 0
3. Failure to Hold a Bifurcated Sentence Hearing
In People v. Lego,3 1 the court held that the trial court did not
err by holding a unitary sentence hearing. a The defendant argued
that this procedure allowed the jury to hear non-statutory aggravating factors during the time when they were trying to decide
whether, as a matter of fact, any statutory aggravating factor had
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.1 3 The defendant claimed
that the non-statutory aggravation is often quite inflammatory and
thus prejudices the defendant on the factual question of the exist-

ence of the statutory aggravating factor.3t 4 The court disposed of
this issue, relying on its earlier decision in People v. Brisbon. 3 5 In
Brisbon, the court held that no prejudice results from this procedure.31 6 The court noted that the only limits on 317
what a jury shall
hear in sentencing is "relevance and reliability.
4. Factors in Aggravation
31 8 the supreme court held that the trial court did
In Christiansen,
not err by using a twenty-two year-old armed robbery conviction
as a death penalty aggravating factor. 31 9 The defendant argued
that, because there was a ten year limitation on the admissibility of
ishment, the court cited People v. Del Vecchio, 105 11. 2d 414, 475 N.E.2d 840, cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 204 (1985).
309. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
310. Guest, 116 I1. 2d at 110, 503 N.E.2d at 273 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at
188-95).
311. 116 I1. 2d 323, 507 N.E.2d 800 (1987). See also supra notes 239-44 and accompanying text.
312. Id. at 346, 507 N.E.2d at 807.
313. Id.
314. Id. The defendant claimed that the jury was allowed to hear "unproved charges
of prison escapes, repeated reference to his recent parole for an offense committed in a
manner similar to the present one, testimony that an 'FBI' rap shL, existed, and evidence
of juvenile adjudications. . . ." Id.
315. Id. (citing People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 478 N.E.2d 402 (1985)).
316. Brisbon, 106 I1. 2d 342, 478 N.E.2d 402 (1985).
317. Id. The court stated:" 'The only limitation upon evidence admitted at the aggravation and mitigation phases of the sentencing hearing are relevance and reliability; the
hearing is not confined by the rules of evidence in effect at the guilt phase of the trial.'"
Id. (quoting People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 364-65).
318. 116 Il1. 2d 96, 506 N.E.2d 1253 (1987); See supra notes 289-96 and 78-85 and
accompanying text for a discussion ,' issues relating to the right of allocution and comments on the defendant's refusal to reduce an oral statement to writing.
319. Id. at 124, 506 N.E.2d at 1264.
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convictions for impeachment purposes, 320 a similar limitation
should be applied to
the aggravation stage of the death penalty sen21

tence proceeding.1

The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that admissibility

to prove aggravation or mitigation depends only on the relevance
and reliability of the evidence. 22 The court held that evidence of
another armed robbery was relevant here because the defendant23

3
was convicted of two armed robberies in addition to murder.
The previous armed robberies were relevant, to show that his

"adult life was characterized by a pattern of criminal behavior,
suggesting, in the words of the court, that his 'potential for rehabil-

itation or restoration to useful citizenship is poor, very poor.'
X.

"324

APPELLATE ISSUES

In People v. Fike,325 the appellate court dismissed as untimely
the defendant's appeal from a revocation of probation and sentence
of six months impr onment.326 The dispositive issue for the
supreme court in reversing was whether the notice of appeal was
filed within the required thirty days.327 Court documents were in
disarray; there were two dates filed on the pertinent appeal documents, one timely and one of them untimely. 32 The court held
that, although the common law record is presumed correct, when
the record itself is contradictory the court must resolve the contradiction. 329 There was no direct evidence to explain the contradictory dates, but the court concluded that the defendant's hypotheses
were reasonable since they fit most logically with the known
facts. 330 The court concluded, therefore, that the defendant's ap320. Id. As support for the defendant's argument, he cited People v,Warmack, 83 I11.
2d 112, 413 N.E.2d 1254 (1980), and People v. Montgomery, 47111. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d
695 (1971).
321. Christiansen, 116 Ill.
2d at 123, 506 N.E.2d at 1264.
322. Id. at 124, 506 N.E.2d at 1264. The court noted that the State correctly cited the
rules governing admissibility of evidence in aggravation and mitigation. Id.
323. Id. at 123, 124, 506 N.E.2d at 1265.
324. Id. at 124, 506 N.E.2d at 1265.
325. 117 Ill. 2d 49, 509 N.E.2d 1011 (1987).
326. Id. at 52, 509 N.E.2d at 1011. The notice of appeal was due to be filed by August
17, 1984, which was thirty days after ti,.
defendant's sentence. On the motion for a new
trial there appeared two dates, August 17 and August 21. Id.
327. Id. at 52, 509 N.E.2d at 1012.
328. Id. at 52-53, 509 N.E.2d at 1012.13.
329. Id. at 56, 509 N.E.2d at 1014. When there is a contradiction, the court may look
at the record as a whole. Id.
330. Id. at 57, 509 N.E.2d at 1014.
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peal must be reinstated. 33 '
XI.

POST-CONVICTION PETITION ISSUES

A. Improper Denial of Hearing on Post-Conviction Petition
In People v. Sanchez,332 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the

trial court erred in dismissing a post-conviction petition without a
hearing.333 The defendant submitted a petition for post-conviction
relief that was supported only by an attorney's affidavit containing
hearsay. 334 Although the court noted that this is generally insufficient to warrant post-conviction relief, capital cases require the
rule to be applied more flexibly. 335 The court stayed the defend-

ant's death sentence until disposition of the post-conviction
petition.336
B.

Waiver by Failing to Raise Issues at Trial

In People v. Silagy,337 the defendant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.338 On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence. 339 The defend-

ant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief which the trial

court dismissed. 3 ° The trial court held that the issues raised in the
petition were either already ruled upon in the defendant's direct
34

appeal to the supreme court or were matters of trial strategy. '

The supreme court agreed with the trial court.3 42 Principally, the
defendant also claimed that newly discovered evidence warranted
331. Id. at 58, 509 N.E.2d at 1015. The court remanded the case to the appellate
court for a decision on the merits of the defendant's appeal. Id. The court wanted to
refrain from making a decision on a "hypertechnical reading" of the rules. Id.
332. 115 I11. 2d 238, 503 N.E.2d 277 (1986). See supra notes 212-26, and accompanying text for a discussion of issues relating to prosecutorial misconduct and jury selection.
333. Id. at 287, 503 N.E.2d at 295.
334. Id. at 283, 284, 503 N.E.2d at 295.
335. Id. at 284, 503 N.E.2d at 295-96. The court held that in capital cases, "procedural fairness and factual accuracy are of paramount importance." Id. at 284, 503 N.E.2d
at 296.
336. Id. at 287, 503 N.E.2d at 297.
337. 116 II1.2d 357, 507 N.E.2d 830 (1987).
33b. Id.
339. Id. See People v. Silagy, 101 I11.2d 147, 461 N.E.2d 415, cert denied, 469 U.S.
873 (1984).
340. 116 I11.2d at 364, 507 N.E.2d at 832.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 373, 507 N.E.2d at 834. The court stated that "[t]he sole issue on this
appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Silagy's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing on the allegations raised by the affidavits that supported
the petition." Id. at 364, 507 N.E.2d at 832.
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an evidentiary hearing on his claim for post-conviction relief.343
The defendant presented a psychiatrist's affidavit, which concluded
that the defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome at
the time of the murders. 344 The defendant contended that this diagnosis was not made at the time of the trial; in fact, it was not an
accepted diagnosis in the scientific community at that time. 345 The
Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with this contention as well, ruling that the defendant's insanity defense included the data to
which the affidavit referred.346 The court concluded that the defendant had not discovered new evidence; he sought merely to relabel what had already been presented. 47
XII.

LEGISLATION

A. Substitution of Judges for the State
Section 114-5 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure was
amended this past year to grant the state the right to move for a
substitution of judges.3 48 The state now has the right to move for a
substitution of judges within ten days of the time at which the case
is placed on the judges docket.3 49 The motion will be granted automatically if done so within ten days.35 If filed after the ten day
period, the state will be required to show cause for the
substitution. 5 1
343. Id. at 367, 507 N.E.2d at 834. The defendant raised also four other issues. They
were as follows: (1) he was denied his right to an impartial jury because of the statutory
method of jury selection; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel for his counsel's
failure to introduce factors in mitigation at the sentencing hearing and for his counsel's
failure to suppress certain custodial statements; (3) his due process rights were violated
because he wasn't told that his statements to examining psychiatrists could be used
against him; and (4) he was not fit to waive counsel for sentencing, and that the trial court
erred by allowing the sentencing jury to hear testimony regarding his violent acts while in
Viet Nam. Id.
344. Id. The defendant claimed that this was a result of his "combat experience in
Viet Nam." Id.
345. Id. at 368, 507 N.E.2d at 934. The psychiatrist who testified at trial as to Silagy's
insanity, stated in an affidavit that this disorder was not considered by him because it was
"not officially recognized by the psychiatric community." Id.
346. Id. at 368-69, 507 N.E.2d at 834-35.
347. Id. The court noted that the evidence of his experiences in Viet Nam was introduced at trial. Id. at 369, 507 N.E.2d at 834.
348. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-5(c)(amended by P.A. 84-1428, which became
effective July 1, 1987).
349. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-5(c)(1987).
350. Id.
351. Id.
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B. Exemption from Jury Service
Public Act 84-1428 was amended, effective July 1, 1987, to eliminate most of the exemptions from jury service.35 2 Members of the
newspaper media are the only persons who are still exempt from
jury service.353 Previously there was an exemption for the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State and other State officials.354 There was also an exemption for certain county and
municipal officials, Christian Scientists, practicing attorneys and
officers of the United States.3 5
C. State's Right to Jury Trial
The state now has a right to a jury trial where the only offense
charged is a felony violation of either the Cannabis Control Act or
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. 56 For the defendant to
waive a jury in the trial of the above two prosecutions, the court
must require both the state and the defendant to waive the jury in
35 7
writing.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

The area of Criminal Procedure is generally the subject of many
Illinois Supreme Court opinions. This Survey period was no exception. The Illinois Supreme Court continued to follow the lead
of the United States Supreme Court in analyzing fourth, fifth, and
sixth amendment rights of the accused. The court has not resorted
to the Illinois Constitution to provide greater protection.35 8 Thus,
at a time when the rights of the accused were given a constricted
reading by the United States Supreme Court, the run of criminal
cases in the Illinois Supreme Court was in the same direction. But
there were some exceptions.
352. ILL. REV STAT. ch. 78, para. 4 (1987). The statute reads as follows:
The following persons shall be exempt from serving as jurors, to wit: all persons
actively employed upon the editorial or mechanical staffs and departments of
any newspaper of general circulation printed and published in this State.

Id.
353. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, para. 4 (1986).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 1LL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-1 (1987).
357. Id.
358. In People v. Tisler, the court held that the Illinois Supreme Court would follow
the United States Supreme Court in analyzing search and seizure problems. The court
found that the Illinois Constitution provided no greater protection than the fourth
amendment. Specifically, the court adopted the Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983),
definition of probable cause. 103 II1.2d 326, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984).

466
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Although applying principles embodied in the United States
Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court has, on occasion during
the Survey period, ruled in favor of the accused. In the area 3 of
59
search and seizure, for example, the court in People v. Lucente
analyzed a Franks v. Delaware360 attack upon a search warrant.
The court upheld the order of the trial court quashing the warrant.36' The court gave an expansive reading of Franks with respect to the kind of showing by an accused which will satisfy the
"substantial preliminary showing" test. 62 A Franks attack has to
be focused upon the veracity of the affiant, not the informant. a63
But what if an accused presents affidavits which assert an alibi for
him during conduct alleged by the informant? Is this an attack on
the affiant or the informant?
The Illinois Supreme Court held that such an affidavit will suffice even though it could be construed as an attack on either. a6
The court held that a contrary rule would virtually bar the accused
the substantial preliminary showing required by
from making
365
Franks.
While nodding in the accused's direction on this point, the court
turned a deaf ear to Lucente's argument on a related matter. Justice Clark clarified a question which had persisted since the Appellate Court opinion in People v. Garcia,366 in which Judge Rizzi held
that a warrant should be quashed whenever it is shown to contain
any false information.367 Franks appears to say, however, that if
probable cause still exists in the affidavit after the false information
is excluded, the warrant is still valid.368 In Lucente, Justice Clark
reiterated this point. A warrant will be quashed only if the exclusion of the false information deprives the affidavit of probable
cause.

369

In analyzing confession cases, the court ruled in favor the accused on a voluntariness question, but against him in applying Mi359. 116 I11. 2d 133, 506 N.E.2d 1269 (1987). See also supra notes 1-17, for a discussion of Lucente.
360. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
361. Lucente, 116 IM.2d at 155, 506 N.E.2d at 1278.
362. Id. at 148-49, 506 N.E.2d at 1275.
363. Franks,438 U.S. at 171.
364. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 149-50, 506 N.E.2d at 1276.
365. Id. at 151-52, 506 N.E.2d at 1277.
366. 109 I11.App. 3d 142, 440 N.E.2d 269 (1st Dist. 1982).
367. Id. at 149, 440 N.E.2d at 271.
368. Franks,438 U.S. at 171-72.
369. Lucente, 116 II. 2d at 146, 506 N.E.2d at 1274.
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randa and Massiah. In People v. Wilson,3 70 the court reversed the
defendant's double murder conviction, finding that the trial court
erred in admitting the defendant's confession .3a7 The court described the burden of proof that is to be applied when an accused is
injured in police custody and considered the issue whether the injuries occurred before or after the confession. The court held that the
state must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries occurred after the confession. a72 This is the same burden
which the state must meet when the issue is whether the injuries
were caused by the state agents.373 In contrast, in Lego v. Twomey,3 7 4 the United States Supreme Court had held that a preponderance standard is sufficient on the overall question of
voluntariness. a 5 When an accused is injured in police custody,
therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court has enunciated a tougher
standard.
The Miranda rule has been under attack by the Justice Department, and recent Supreme Court decisions have undermined its effect. 376 In People v. Whitehead,3 77 the court was called upon to
apply the Edwards v. Arizona3 7 rule that once a defendant in custody requests counsel, the police may not thereafter initiate any
exchanges or conversations with him about the crime. 79 In Whitehead, the court held that the Edwards rule had not been violsted
by the police decision to permit the defendant to visit with his sister-in-law after he had requested counsel.3 s°
In People v. Christiansen,3 a' the court held that the prosecution
could introduce evidence that the defendant refused to give a writ370.
text for
371.
372.

116 I11. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987). See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying
a discussion of Wilson.
Id. 41-42, 506 N.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 40, 506 N.E.2d at 575.

373. Id.
374.
375.
376.

404 U.S. 477 (1972).
Id. at 489.

OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION. In New York v. Quarles,

the Court created a "public safety" exception to Miranda. 467 U.S. 649 (1983). In
Quarles, the Court held that in limited circumstances where public safety is involved,
such as in a kidnapping situation where human life is at stake, a failure to give Miranda
warnings will not invalidate a statement. Id. at 657-58.
377. 116 111. 2d 425, 508 N.E.2d 687 (1987). See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Whitehead.
378. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
379. Whitehead, 116 Il1. 2d at 436, 508 N.E.2d at 690.
380. Id. at 440, 508 N.E.2d at 690.
381. 116 Ill. 2d 96, 506 N.E.2d 1253 (1987). See also notes 78 to 85 and accompanying text for a discussion of Christiansen.
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ten statement after having given an oral confession preceded by a
valid waiver.382 This evidence did not constitute a comment upon
his assertion of his right to silence, because he had waived that
right before the oral statement.38 3
The court applied the Massiah rule strictly against the accused
as well, holding in People v. Patterson384 that the waiver standard
under the sixth amendment is no higher than that which is applied
in the Miranda fifth amendment setting. 385 The United States
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Patterson to consider
whether a higher standard of waiver is required under the sixth
amendment than under Miranda.as6
Outside the context of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment,
the court analyzed several problem areas in trial and appellate procedure, including effective assistance of counsel, sentencing, and
the death penalty. In the area of sentencing, the court confronted
the vexing propensity of trial judges to "double count" aggravating
factors in determining sentence. In People v. White 387 and People v.
Saldivar388 the trial judge had used the age of the victim and the
harm caused the victim, respectively, as aggravating factors. The
supreme court reversed these sentences. 38 9 The court reiterated the
rule of People v. Conover390 that when a factor such as age or degree of harm is an element of the offense, that factor cannot be
counted as an aggravating factor for purposes of sentencing.39 '
The court had occasion during the Survey period to clarify sev382. Id. at 120, 506 N.E.2d at 1263.
383. Id.
384. 116 Ill. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987). See also notes 86 to 92 and accompanying text for a discussion of Patterson.
385. Id. at 300, 507 N.E.2d at 847.
386. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Patterson that a valid waiver was made out
where the State showed that the defendant had been adequately warned under Miranda
and was aware of the charges pending against him. Miranda, of course, carries no requirement that the police advise an accused of the charges against him. In fact, in Colorado v.Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987), the Court held that a waiver was valid even though
the police questioned the defendant about an offense unrelated to that for which he was
arrested. Arguably then, the Illinois court did create a higher waiver standard by emphasizing that Patterson knew what he had been charged with. A valid sixth amendment
waiver would require this additional showing. The drawback to such an interpretation is
the court's explicit statement that it found no reason to create a higher standard.
387. 114 111. 2d 61, 499 N.E.2d 467 (1986). See supra notes 245-52 and accompanying
text for a discussion of White.
388. 113 Ill. 2d 2556, 497 N.E.2d 1138 (1986). See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Saldivar.
389. See supra notes 252-56 and 258, and accompanying text respectively.
390. 84 Ill. 2d 400, 419 N.E.2d 906 (1981).
391. See supra notes 250-52 and 255 and accompanying text, respectively, for a discussion of Conover as applied to White and Saldivar.
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eral aspects of the death penalty statute. Echoing the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree392 the
court ruled that "death qualifying" prospective jurors during voir
dire does not deprive a defendant of his right to a fair cross section
on the jury or to an impartial jury. 39 3 The court upheld a defendant's jury waiver at a death penalty sentencing hearing even
though the defendant claimed he waived the jury because he was
unaware that the jury's decision on death had to be unanimous. 94
The court also discussed the propriety of using certain convictions for establishing eligibility for the death penalty or as an aggravating factor. A twenty-two year old armed robbery conviction
was admissible as aggravation, 395 and a California murder conviction was admissible to establish eligibility for the death penalty. 96
Finally, the court ruled that there is no requirement for the trial
court to conduct a bifuricated hearing on the issue of death penalty
eligibility and actual imposition. 97

392. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
393. Whitehead, 116 Il1. 2d at 449, 508 N.E.2d at 696, and Sanchez, 115 M1.2d at
265, 503 N.E.2d at 286.
394. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d at 414, 499 N.E.2d at 1349.
395. Christiansen, 116 Il1. 2d at 123-24, 506 N.E.2d at 1264.
396. Guest, 115 Ill. 2d at 104, 503 N.E.2d at 273.
397. Lego, 116 Il1.2d at 346, 507 N.E.2d at 807.

